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LONG-TERM DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN BRAZIL
CHARLES W. COOKSON II*
The residents and visitors to the Brazilian city of Sao Paulo,
the country's major financial and industrial center, drive around
the surrounding regions of the state in a patchwork of highways
that are referred to in everyday conversation not by their num-
bers, but instead by their names. Interstates Anhangiiera,
Raposo Tavares, Bandeirantes and Fernao Dias, honoring the rug-
ged and fearless leaders of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury bandeiras, radiate like spokes from the city, stretching north,
south and west across the state's outback. The bandeiras were the
armed posses that searched the hinterlands seeking to acquire
gold on behalf of the Portuguese crown and to apprehend scores of
native Brazilians for enslavement in the plantations.' As a direct
result of the bandeiras, the borders of colonial Brazil were greatly
expanded beyond the geographic limits imposed by a papal bull,
that led to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas.2 which, in turn, split
the unclaimed territory of the New World between the rival colo-
nizing powers of Spain and Portugal. Today, the members of the
bandeiras, known as the bandeirantes, are revered in song and
story for staking claims to land that tripled the country's size.
However, despite the praise over the bandeiras, the impact of
their performance in Brazil's long-term economic well-being can
be reviewed in light of local availability of the world's most impor-
tant commodity -- energy. Despite the actions of the bandeiras,
Brazil pays dearly for natural gas piped in from Bolivia, for elec-
tricity transmitted from the joint hydro power plant it built along
with the government of Paraguay, and for petroleum shipped from
Argentina. The high cost of dollar-priced energy has a substantial
impact on the country's current financial account, and has been
one of the causes of Brazil's persistent economic weakness and
inability to put its economy on a stable and solid growth track.
Growth always accompanies a rise in the demand for power, yet
* J.D., American University, 1992; M.A., American University, 1995; LL.B.
(Rev.), Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1999.
1. See CHARLES WAGLEY-, AN INTRODUCTION TO BRAZIL 28, 67-68 (Revised ed.
1971). See also V1ANNA MOOG, BANDEIRANTES E PIONEIROS 180-83 (7th ed.) (a
different perspective on the impact of the bandeiras on colonial Brazil's history)
2. See WAGLEY, supra note 1, at 67-8; MOOG, supra note 1, at 181-82.
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Brazil has been unable to create reliable market structures to
meet the increased energy needs in times of such brisk economic
activity. Although the bandeiras were relentless and tenacious,
had they pursued further and farther, contemporary Brazil would
certainly have an improved energy infrastructure than that in
which it currently finds itself, which could have meant the ability
to provide a higher standard of living as well as stable economic
conditions for its population, despite its many other challenges.
For example, if the bandeiras would have forded the Paraguay-
Parand river basin and pushed further toward the Pacific Ocean
into the present-day Paraguayan chaco, or up and over the Andes
mountain range, Brazil could well have become a beneficiary of
the rise in the cost of energy over the last few decades, instead of
its casualty.'
Clearly, the benefit of hindsight makes the best course of
action more focused than it may have been at the time of the
bandeiras. Territorial aggrandizement is evidently no longer an
option in the 21st century, nevertheless, there are lessons to be
learned from past experiences. Since the topic of this article is
direct foreign investment, the stimuli and constraints for invest-
ment are most aptly understood by viewing Brazil's history. For-
eign equity investment normally requires the investor to make a
long-term financial commitment in the foreign markets in which it
engages in business activities. In such cases, the investor may
find it difficult to shut down a production facility, divest its assets
and withdraw in the face of changing circumstances that bring
increasing risk. By contrast, portfolio investment requires only a
short-term commitment to turn a profit. In the latter case, the
investor often has the possibility of quick escape in the event of an
increasing risk.
Therefore, one must ask what happened to the foreign compa-
nies who invested in Brazil during the 1970s or 1980s, and per-
3. In the 1970s, nuclear power was thought to hold the key to a reliable energy
supply. Brazil is self-sufficient in uranium, the primary raw material used in nuclear
power generation, which led successive governments to launch and implement a plan
to construct eight nuclear plants with technology supplied by the engineering firm
Siemens. Only two plants were completed and currently operate, while the
equipment for a third nuclear power plant was purchased but remains idle.
Thereafter, plans to build the remaining five power plants were scrapped more due to
a lack of funds than to concerns about the safety of nuclear energy generation. Since
then, efforts in developing new energy sources have focused on the production of
ethanol for combustion engines and on deep-sea oil exploration. See No Caminho Das
Aguas, CARTA CAPITAL, Oct. 8, 2003, at 8-11, describing Brazilian oil giant Petrobras'
push to increase offshore oil production.
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haps even before then, in order to have the clearest definition of
the incentives and limitations on inbound direct investment in
Brazil in 2004 and beyond. It is the cultural, political, and eco-
nomic history of Brazil which provides some of the answers to
whether one should make a long-term commitment to the future.
This article points out a few of these lessons, and concludes by
proposing actions that will increase the protection afforded to for-
eign investment which is badly needed to move the local economy
forward.
Many intelligent foreign investors have studied Brazil to eval-
uate its market potential, and have made either a "go" or "no-go"
investment decision as a result. It appears that over the years,
the decisions on whether to invest have been quite cautious, due
to the fact that the low percentage of direct investment to total
national product has remained fairly constant. Nevertheless, data
from the Brazilian Central Bank reflects an increase in the level
of aggregate foreign direct investment in Brazil since 1995.2
These were years in which large state holdings in the telecom and
financial sectors were successfully sold to foreign bidders. The
single exception to this trend is the investment level in 2003,
which reflects an expectation that estimated foreign direct invest-
ment will only amount to a mere nine billion dollars,5 as the
world's economy takes a step back and recovers from the hangover
brought about by difficult years for the business sector in 2001
and 2002. However, this trend appears to indicate renewed and
sustained confidence in Brazil on the part of foreign investors.
Many investors have acquired privatized state companies, paid for
concessions to provide services delegated by the state, and are
joint venturing with local partners or setting up companies on
their own.
The incentives for foreign direct investment in Brazil are eas-
ier to isolate than the constraints. The obvious incentive of for-
eign direct investment is to reach one of the largest markets in the
world. Brazil is a large country with a sizeable population, and
consequently it offers a very large market. Brazil's population has
4. See Cdmbio e capitais estrangeiros, BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, at http://www.
bcb.gov.brPCAMBIO.
5. See Luciana Otoni, Entrada de investimento 6 muito baixa, GAZETA
MERCANTIL, Nov. 21, 2003, at 1. Net FDI decreased to $3.5 billion in the first
semester of 2003 from $9.6 billion in the first semester of 2002, for a reduction of 63%.
See Ney Hayashi da Cruz, Investimento externo no Brasil cai 63%, FOLHA ONLINE,
July 25, 2003, at http//wwwl.folha.vol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u70845.shtml.
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expanded from 60 million in 1960, to 176 million in 2003.6 If cur-
rent population growth rates remain constant, the country's popu-
lation should rival the United States' population by the mid
twenty-first century. Continued westward and rural-urban
migration attests to the demographic mobility of the population
and an immigrant work ethic remains firmly rooted in cities, such
as Sao Paulo, which were built by huge influxes of Italian, Leba-
nese and Japanese newcomers.7 Brazilian consumers equate for-
eign brand names with quality products. Therefore, they are
generally willing to pay a premium to purchase these goods.
Moreover, in recent years, Brazilian goods have been provided
favorable access to neighboring countries through its membership
in the Mercosul free trade area agreement. Argentina, Uruguay
and Paraguay are full signatories of the trade agreement, and the
government is expected to engage in ad hoc consultations with the
rest of the hemisphere in anticipation of widening the reach of the
commercial treaty, by expanding the market through multilateral
reductions in tariffs and the removal of other barriers to trade.'
Additionally, Brazilian history offers strong evidence that
Brazil will continue as a large market and not fracture into
smaller ones, as has happened in the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia with the fall of communism. During its early history,
despite liberator Simon Bolivar's wishes, Spanish South and Cen-
tral America was balkanized into many States, while Portuguese
South America remained one country throughout its existence.
The cultural and political bonds that have kept Brazil together as
a single entity for 500 years serve as a strong argument for its
continuance as a single country in the future. Brazil has long
enjoyed a form of social democracy which has allowed it to hold
together under very trying times.
Certainly, there are increasing social tensions in areas such
as race and religion. In 1960, the country was a religious mono-
lith, with almost 95% of Brazilians classifying themselves as
Roman-Catholic.9 Even though Catholicism remains the religion
6. Carl Haub, 2003 World Population Data Sheet, POPULATION REFERENCE
BUREAU, at http://www.prb.org/Template.cfm?Section=PRB&template=/Contentl
ContentGroups/Datasheets/2003 WorldPopulationDataSheet.htm.
7. See WAGLEY, supra note 1, at 69.
8. In November 2003, representatives of 34 American states convened in Miami
to discuss and negotiate the scope of a hemispheric free trade agreement. See Acerto
de cavalheiros, ItPOCA, Nov. 24, 2003, at 49; Editorial, A Alca em movimento, JORNAL
DA TARDE, Nov. 23, 2003, at A3.
9. Nilza de Oliveira Martins Pereira, A religido nos censos brasileiros:
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of choice for a majority of the population, 15% of Brazilians now
consider themselves Protestants and a further 10% do not practice
a religion. ° In 1960, race-based organizations did not exist.
Today, race-based movements are seeking to improve the lot of
their members, and as proof of these efforts, Brazil has seen the
recent introduction of racial preferences into the admissions policy
of Rio de Janeiro's public universities." In the wake of the imple-
mentation of these changes in public education, the need for
affirmative action is undergoing a simmering debate, although it
is a tame discourse when compared to the stronger reactions that
erupted in the U.S. after the 1978 landmark ruling in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke," and thereafter in the court
battles over the reach of equal protection, the effects of past dis-
crimination, and the need to promote racial diversity. Nonethe-
less, the flexibility Brazilians have traditionally demonstrated in
dealing with their multitude of problems provides a basis for con-
fronting problems which the future will bring.
Other relevant incentives come in the more familiar shape of
tax holidays for investments in less developed regions." These tax
holidays have attracted assembly industries to the Brazilian Ama-
zon and to the poor northeastern states. Beginning in the mid-
1990's, the federal government's industrial policy encouraged
automotive companies to invest in Brazil and household names
such as Renault, Honda, Toyota, and DaimlerChrysler eagerly set
up assembly plants and qualified for generous duty and tax incen-
tives. Automotive part companies soon followed the lead of the
automotive companies. Their arrival increased the level of local
competition with incumbent automotive companies such as Gen-
eral Motors, Ford, FIAT and Volkswagen. This increase in the
number of domestic car manufacturers has certainly benefited the
Brazilian car buyer, but has eventually led to excess production
capacity, much to the chagrin of Chrysler, which has since closed
its plant in the southern state of Parandt. 14 Given current market
informaC6es preliminares do Cerso Demogrdfico 2000, at http://www.sbpcnet.org.br/
eventos/54ra/TEXTOS/SBPC/SBPC%20Nilza%20Pereira.htm.
10. Id.
11. See Reserva de vagas na Uerj 4 inconstitucional, diz Brindeiro, TRIBUNA DA
IMPRENSA, June 18, 2003 with arguments presented by Brazil's Attorney-General to
defeat the quota system.
12. Regents of the University of California v. Baake, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. See CONsTITui(;Ao DA REPUBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRAsIL [BRAz. CONST.] art. 43,
§ 2-(11) (1988).
14. See Nicholas Winning, DaimlerChrysler Closing Plant, LABoURNET GERMANY,
Sept. 5, 2001, at http://www.labournet.de/branchen/auto/cut-neu5.html.
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conditions, it is likely that at least one additional automotive
manufacturer will either divest or shut down and leave Brazil."
In addition to the incentives delineated above, other federal
incentives include eligibility for low-interest loans to qualifying
projects in order to reduce the need for the investor to use its own
resources as initial capital investment of start-up projects. 6 Sub-
sidized loans have been important in a business environment
where the cost of money in the local money market is prohibitive,
and access to capital markets is not widespread or appealing to
investors. State incentives focus on the deferral of ICMS
Imposto Sobre a Circulago de Mercadorias e Pretado de Servigos
- sales tax payments, a mechanism that has raised controversy
among those who do not believe that competition between states
for new investment is a healthy public policy tool."
The long-term limitations on investment, which are rooted in
Brazilian law, politics and economics, are hard to isolate and even
harder to eliminate. This article provides examples of a few deter-
minant approaches from each of these three fields. Brazil's legal
culture is partially rooted in Roman and ecclesiastical law. As
Gilberto Freyre, one of Brazil's leading sociologists, explained in
his classic study, Casa Grande e Senzala, Catholic influence in
colonial Brazil was so strong that ecclesiastical law determined
much of the structure of early colonial times.'" Grievous violation
of the law was the failure to accept the Catholic faith. Peijury is
referred to in the Brazilian Criminal Code as false testimony, a
term which comes from the Eighth Commandment. 9 In contrast,
civil, commercial, and criminal violations were viewed as earthly,
15. See Audi ndo fard mais carro no Brasil, JoRNAL DA TARDE, January 8, 2004, at
All.
16. Because credit is scarce in Brazil, the country's federal development bank
(BNDES) supplies qualifying projects with long-term loans at a cost below the
domestic market interest rates, which rank among the world's highest. For more
information on the bank's loan programs, see 0 BANcO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO, Www.
bndes.gov.br.
17. See Guerra Fiscal (Corn ela todos perdem), Apresentado do Relat6rio da
Comissdo Parlamentar de Inqudrito da Assemblgia Legislativa do Est. de Sao Paulo
14-15 (2d ed. 1997), published in the Decreto No. 33.980, de 29 de Setembro de 2003,
D.O.E. em 30.09.2003. On the other hand, despite the country's historic dependence
on expensive foreign energy sources discussed at the beginning of the article,
governments have granted tax incentives to power-intensive sectors such as the
aluminum industry, creating a distorted and inequitable tax policy. For example, the
state of Rio de Janeiro has recently granted ICMS incentives to new aluminum
industries through Decreto No. 33.980, published in D.O.E. 30.09.2003.
18. See GILBERTO FREYRE, CASA GRANDE & SENZALA 102-03 (41st ed. 2000).
19. BRAz. CONST. art. 342.
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less serious transgressions. Not surprisingly, civil law was not
elevated to the same pinnacle that it reached in the United States.
There is a long-standing Brazilian adage that one should do every-
thing possible for one's friends, nothing at all for those who are
neither friends nor enemies, and apply the law to one's enemies.
Many foreigners hearing this aphorism for the first time are ini-
tially startled by it. On the other hand, to this day, one is less
likely to hear the Lord's name taken in vain in Brazil than in
America.
The restriction that Brazil's legal culture presents to a foreign
investor is that commercial disputes are less likely to be resolved
by legal action than they are in more mature markets. This is not
to say that one should not hire good lawyers. Rather, that the
dependence on the resolution of problems through the courts is
somewhat less encompassing in Brazil than in other countries."
Perhaps part of the reason for a reliance on dispute resolution plu-
ralism lies in the great length of time demanded by the court sys-
tem to reach a final decision, which can take up to twenty years or
more, an intolerable time span for many investors.
In that same vein, the proposal for a constitutional amend-
ment to introduce the concept of the sdmula vinculante, or 'bind-
ing holding', into Brazilian civil procedure is encouraging." This
concept embraces the principle of stare decisis, or binding legal
precedent, which every U.S. law student learns in the first year of
law school. Common law courts stand by good precedent, and as a
matter of policy, do not disturb a settled point of law, but instead
apply authoritative case law to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same. On the other hand, Brazilian civil law is
codified and although case law is considered a source of law in
Brazil,22 the decisions of higher courts are not binding on lower
courts except in limited circumstances.23 This approach creates a
20. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction
and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada, LAW & Soc'Y REV. 5 (Fall 1977), for an
example of an unofficial legal system developed to settle disputes in a squatter
settlement in Rio de Janeiro.
21. See Art. 103A of SF PEC (Proposal for Constitutional Amendment) 29/2000.
22. See MARcus CLAuDio ACQUAVIVA, DIcIoNARIo JURIDico BRASILEIRO ACQUAVIVA
750 (9th ed. 1998).
23. For example, Brazilian civil procedure allows a plaintiff with proper standing
to file a direct cause of action to uphold or to challenge the constitutionality of a law.
Art. 102 of the Constitution provides that the Federal Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over judicial review. If a finding of unconstitutionality is reached by the
Court, the law will be declared null and void erga omnes, i.e., with respect to all. See
BRAz. CONST. art. 102.
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scenario where conflicting judicial decisions benefit some parties,
while withholding this same benefit from other parties standing in
the same exact position. Under the proposal before the Senate, a
2/3 majority of the High Court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal,
may publish an order that binds the courts to a holding on a legal
issue that comes up for consideration on a recurring basis.24
Detractors of the proposal point out that the implementation of
the sidmula vinculante will limit the independence of lower court
judges, while proponents argue that the benefit will come in the
form of greater efficiency, judicial economy and increased cer-
tainty and finality in the outcome of legal trials.25
On another level, a welcome development has been the availa-
bility of binding arbitration as a viable alternative method to
resolve such disputes. In recent years, concerns that arose with
respect to commercial arbitration's usefulness in Brazil have cur-
tailed its unfettered use by litigating parties, and came to a head
during a hearing held before the High Court to determine whether
to recognize a foreign arbitration award." The Chief Justice at
the time expressed concern with narrow legal rules27 in connection
to the specific performance of arbitration clauses, that, if enforced,
allegedly denied one's "day in court." However, this concern was
cleared in 2001, when the Court sitting en banc held that the arbi-
tration law as drafted by Congress passed constitutional muster."
24. See Art. 103A of SF PEC (Proposal for Constitutional Amendment) 29/2000.
25. Clhudio Dias de Castro, Sdmulas Vinculantes: Uma (Dis)Soluqdo Jurdica, 8-
9, at http://www.mundojuridico.adv.br/documentos/artigos/texto427.doc.
26. Brazil acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards on April 25, 2002. See Decreto No. 52, de
25 de abril de 2002, D.O.U. de 26.04.02. See also Carlos Nehring Neto, Brazil and the
New York Convention - A Case of Adherence by Osmosis, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
257-60 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 2002).
27. See Arnoldo Wald, et al, Some Controversial Aspects of the New Brazilian
Arbitration Law, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 223, 228-29 (2000). See also
ALBERTO DE ORLEANS E BRAGANIA, ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
LATIN AMERICA: BRAZIL 19-27 (Bernardo M. Cremades ed. 1998).
28. See RSTF, No. 5206-7, Relator: Ministro Sepulveda Pertence, 10.10.96. The
decision to deny the motion for reconsideration reads: "0 Tribunal, por unanimidade,
proveu o agravo para homologar a senten~a arbitral, vencidos parcialmente os
Senhores Ministros Sepdilveda Pertence, Sydney Sanches, N1ri da Silveirae Moreira
Alves, no que declaravam a inconstitucionalidade do pardgrafo fnico do art. 60; do art.
7' e seus parhgrafos; no art. 41, das novas redagaes atribuidas ao art. 267, inc. VII, e
ao art. 301, inc. IX, do C6digo de Processo Civil; e do art. 42, todos da Lei 9.307, de 23
de setembro de 1996. Votou o Presidente, o Senhor Min. Marco Aurdlio." In English,
"[tihe Court voted unanimously to accept the appeal and certify the arbitration
decision, having rejected arguments submitted by Justices Pertence, Sanches and
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As a result, the institution is poised to gain wider acceptance
given its obvious advantages, such as speed, cost efficiency, final-
ity, use of experts as knowledgeable arbitrators, and greater confi-
dentiality. Nonetheless, the law provides that a party may still
contest the recognition of a foreign arbitration award on procedu-
ral grounds,29 on grounds that it infringes national public policy,'0
or on grounds that it rules on a subject matter that Brazilian law
places outside of the scope of arbitration. 1
Regarding Brazil's government, the country's political culture
evinces a strong paternalistic approach, different from that found
in many other Western countries. Until nearly the end of the
nineteenth century, Brazil had an active, powerful emperor who
famously encouraged immigration of Confederate Southerners
after the American Civil War.2 Throughout the years, the Brazil-
ian outback has been politically dominated by the corongis, men
who effectively controlled large tracts of territory through
patronage and fear, and who, in the course of the country's early
experiments with democracy, stuffed ballot boxes to ensure that
they or their appointed candidates prevailed in the elections.3 In
the middle of the twentieth century, this strong undercurrent of
paternalism returned in the form of the Vargas dictatorship, and
later in the form of military governments. While the present polit-
ical order provides for fair and open elections, it is reasonable to
expect that the political culture will not eliminate its attraction to
paternalism from one day to the next.
Another constraint that Brazil's political culture presents is
that decision-making is often more personal than abstract.
Problems are resolved more by power-holders than by legal prece-
dent or respect for institutional decision-making. Such a process
leads to delays far longer than one meets in a less paternalistic
society. Even when the opinions of third parties are taken into
consideration and pressures from organized groups are heeded,
the executive branch has a recurring urge to meddle with the free
Moreira Alves which declared the unconstitutionality of the following sections of Law
9.307/96: arts. 6 and 7; art. 41, with the interpretations imputed to art. 267(VII) and
to art. 301(X) of the Civil Procedure Code; and art. 42."
29. BRAz. CONST. art. 38.
30. Id. at art. 39.
31. Id.
32. See Stephen Buckley, A Taste of Dixie in Brazil, WASHINGTON PosT FoREIGN
SERVICE, Aug. 22, 1999, at A23.
33. See Santos, supra note 20, at 112. An early method of influencing elections
was the voto de cabresto, when the local coronel essentially dictated their choice of
candidates to voters in exchange for favors or through intimidation.
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workings of the economy. For example, the current administra-
tion's cabinet members have interfered with the market through
misguided attempts to introduce changes they claimed would
boost output or reduce industry costs. In one instance, an
announcement by the Secretary of Mines and Energy that the cost
of fuel would drop34 caused a spike in the prices at the pump as
gas station owners reacted to provide for what was perceived as a
future contingency. 5 In a similar situation, when the Secretary of
Industrial Development revealed plans for the future implementa-
tion of a government-sponsored relief program targeting the auto
industry that would lower prices for new cars, buyers promptly
delayed purchases, thereby causing a drop in sales. 6
In addition to a political environment that tolerates some
decisions taken by executive fiats, is the issue of political unac-
countability. Brazil has a few dozen registered political parties, of
which about ten have relevant congressional representation.
However, party allegiance is virtually non-existent as politicians
may switch back and forth between parties at will, even within
days after taking office." The plethora of political parties coupled
with the ease of transferring one's membership from one party to
another results, as one might expect, in time-consuming negotia-
tions between them to reach a consensus for the approval of a bill.
Also, Brazil's economic culture creates volatile performance.
There are many reasons that Brazil passed through sharp, and
often severe, business cycles in the last half of the twentieth cen-
tury. One of the main contributing factors is an excess of enthusi-
34. Combustiveis mais baratos, 0 GLOBO, April 29, 2003, at http://www.abradeco
nt.org.br/290403.htm#Combustiveis; Eduardo Castro, Governo promete fiscalizar
prego da gasolina em postos e distribuidoras, RADio BANDEIRANTES, May 29, 2003, at
http://www.radiobandeirantes.com.br/reporteronline/interna.asp?id-not=28910.
35. Preqo da gasolina estd acima do "sugerido" em 17 Estados, NETLIG NEWS, May
29, 2003, at http://www.netlignews.compgdetalhes.asp?IDCategoria=1605; Preqo da
gasolina vai subir na segunda, Sincopetro, Aug. 8, 2003, at http://www.sincopetro.org
br/mostranoticia.asp?m=584; Humberto Medina, Gasolina ndo deve cair mesmo corn
fim da greve na Nigdria, FOLHA ONLINE, Jul. 9, 2003, at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/
folha/dinheiro/ult91u70020.shtml; Gasolina n&o baixa nos pr6ximos dois meses,
GRuPo PRESIDENTE, July 15, 2003, at http://www.grupopresidente.com.br/noticias.
asp?identificacao=68.
36. See Paula Pacheco, Faisca no Motor, POLITICA BRASIL, at http://www.
politicabrasil.com.br/visualizaNoticia.cfm?cd noticia=340.
37. 104 of the 513 congresspersons elected in 2002, or 20% of the total number,
switched political parties, and 22 out of these 104 switched parties a second time
during the first nine months of the current four year presidential term of office. See
Ricardo Mignone, Cdmara Tenta Votar Po1~mica Lei de Fal~ncias Nesta Semana,
FOHLA ONLINE, Oct. 13, 2003, at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u
54373.shtml.
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asm which constantly reappears in Brazilian economic history,
and stems from the Brazilian economic policy's endeavor to hurry
the arrival of the future." One example was the slogan of the
Kubitschek administration in the 1950s: "Fifty years of progress
in five." 9 Some of the subsequent military governments sought
hot house double-digit annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth through borrowing for public works and investment in
state controlled enterprises, which eventually proved impossible
to sustain. Thus, the limitation that Brazil's economic culture
presents to foreign investors is how to ride the boom and bust eco-
nomic cycles that such macroeconomic volatility produces.,'
Despite the fact that it is harder to make mid-term and long-term
projections in the face of increased uncertainty, managers who fail
to introduce flexibility into their financial planning and opera-
tions often have unexpected difficulty in developing their Brazil-
ian markets.
Increasing and distributing wealth has been the mantra of
successive governments. There is a general agreement on the
need to develop economic policies which provide job opportunities
for the rapidly expanding Brazilian population. Economic growth
can result from: (1) getting more workers in the economy, (2) get-
ting more capital into the economy, and (3) applying the capital in
such a way that it increases the productivity of the workers. Bra-
zil has a rapidly expanding population, but this does not mean
that this growing population is solely comprised of productive
workers. Clearly, members of the Brazilian population become
productive workers through good education policies and opportu-
nities. Deciding how education policies are implemented and
determining where public investment in education is directed can
hinder or bolster the goal of fair and universal public education.
Giving free university education to upper-middle class students is
one of the numerous unwise Brazilian public policies that are gen-
erally kinder to the well off than to the poor.41
38. The 1970s were paradigmatic. See No Caminho Das Aguas, supra note 3, at 8.
39. See Juscelino Kubitschek, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
JuscelinoKubitschek; see also David Lanegan, Brasilia, at http://www.macalester.
edu/courses/geog6l/j moerschlgeography.html.
40. See Antonio Luiz M. C. Costa, Ndo Se Ufane Tanto, CARTA CAPiTAL, Oct. 8,
2003, at 28-29, for a summary of the cyclical economic booms of the 20th Century.
41. See Mailson Da N6brega, Pela Universidade Pziblica (E Paga Por Quem Pode),
O ESTADO DE SAo PAULO, Nov. 23, 2003, at B4. The author was a beneficiary of one
these skewed education policies as he attended the well-regarded undergraduate law
program of the University of Sao Paulo for the duration of seven semesters and for a
total sunk cost of $100.
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In spite of these obstacles, the Brazilian worker increases his
productivity mainly through improving education. The country is
close to achieving universal education at the lower school level,
and is now setting its sights on lifting the quality of its elementary
education." A twin goal is to obtain the same results for middle
and high school enrollments in order to raise the country's level of
education to benchmark international standards. At the same
time, Brazil can not just devise spending programs that allocate
money to education. Money in education is definitely not the
whole answer, but it helps and to get the needed capital for educa-
tion, the country needs to change many of its existing spending
policies in all areas which benefit a minority at the expense of all
the rest. The recent discord over the retirement system for civil
servants is an illustration of Brazil's existing spending policy.44
Another example is the level of payroll taxes that inhibits hiring,
and the statutory severance payments that discourage firing by
the private sector, making employment opportunities harder to
come by for job seekers. 5
Perhaps where the Brazilian government can have its biggest
impact on economic development is through building a strong cen-
tral bank, and establishing firm controls on its fiscal policy. In the
past, Brazil has not had a particularly effective central bank, and
its fiscal policies have varied over time from far-too-loose to far-
too-tight. Both have contributed to the economic volatility that
has marked Brazil's economic development. Any direct foreign
investment should be made only after a careful analysis of the pre-
sent strength of the central bank, the experience of its directors,
and the adequacy of Brazilian monetary policies. Notably, the
interest rate policy pursued by the country's central bankers had
42. A educaqdo dez anos depois de Jomtien, UNESCO, Oct. 1999, at http://www.
unesco.org.br/noticias/un999/un999b.html.
43. Jorge Werthein, A Vez do Ensino Mgdio, UNESCO, at http://www.unesco.org.
br/noticiaslartigos/artigowb.asp; FUNDO DE UNIVERSALIZACAO DOS SERVIVOS DE
TELECOMUNICAQOES, at http://www.proinfo.es.gov.br/fustifust.htm; see Simon
Schwartzman, Eunice Ribeiro Durham, & Jos6 Goldemberg, A Educagdo no Brasil em
uma perspectiva de transformaqdo, at http:f/www.schwartzman.org.br/simonl
transform.htm.
44. Entenda a reforma da Previd6ncia, NITERI, July 18, 2003, at http:/www.
ibasm.ij.gov.br/news/noticia.asp?id=297; Luciene Braga, Desafio inadidvel e
impopular, 0 Dia, Dec. 22, 2002, at http'//www.unafisco-rj.org.br/Clipping/
ODia20021222.htm; Reforma da Previd~ncia - Noticias, at http:flwww.federativo.
bndes.gov.br/destaques/refprev-noticias.htm.
45. See Fabiana Futema, Brasil tern a segunda maior carga tributdria sobre
saldrios do mundo, FOLHA ONLINE, at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult
91u82127.shtml.
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impressive success in subduing inflationary pressures in 2003,46
albeit at the cost of reduced short-term growth and higher unem-
ployment rates.
As for government spending, a remarkable period of brisk
growth in the early 1970's referred to as the 'Brazilian economic
miracle', lasted for several years and was fueled chiefly by the
solid fiscal policies undertaken during the Castelo Branco presi-
dency (1964-1967). 41 This growth was brought to an end partly
due to a deterioration of the country's balance of payments, caused
by a twelve-fold increase in the U.S. dollar value of Brazilian
imports between 1970 and 1978, which was principally caused by
the unprecedented rise in the price of the oil barrel.' In recent
administrations, restraint has been achieved by reigning in
spending and raising tax receipts, steps that were taken in order
to secure a budget surplus sufficient in size which, in conjunction
with emergency loans from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), worked to dispel rumblings of impending default. Notwith-
standing these efforts, fears arose anew in 2002, due to the left-
leaning political views of the current president in the wake of his
commanding lead in the early polls, and they materialized in the
decisions taken by many banks and commercial lenders to reduce
their investment portfolios in Brazil. 9 A statement released in
June of 2002 by the president's political party had, as its center-
piece, a commitment to respect vested with contractual and prop-
erty rights, which proved to be a turning-point.0 Since then,
misgivings about prospects for the Brazilian economy have given
way to renewed optimism. The implementation of confidence-
building actions, continuity in sound fiscal and monetary poli-
cies,"' and the avoidance of politically expedient expansionary
solutions bodes well for the near future, in which falling interest
46. See Editorial, Otimismo Crescente, JORNAL DA TARDE, Dec. 3, 2003, at A3.
47. MARIA LucIA TEiERA WERNECK VIENNA, A ADMINISTRACAO DO MILAGRE, 110-
34 (Vozes ed. 1987).
48. See Regis Bonelli & Pedro S. Malan, Os Limites do Possivel: Notas Sobre o
Balanqo de Pagamentos e Indastria nos Anos 70, PESQUISA E PLANEJAMENTO
ECONOMICO, Aug. 1975 at 353-75. But see id. at 353-406, arguing that the balance of
payments crisis coincided with a liquidity crunch and was only partially triggered by
the oil crisis.
49. Simon Romero, As Foreign Banks Take Flight, Brazil Regroups, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2002; Tony Smith, U.S. Banks Trim Operations in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2003, at W1; Developing Returns, BARjROfS, Sept. 30, 2002, at 27.
50. See Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, Carta ao povo brasileiro, LA INSIGNIA, at http:ll
www.lainsignia.org/2002/junio/ibe-117.htm.
51. See Editorial, Palocci ao PT: Ndo Vamos Abrir as Torneiras em 2004, JORNAL
DA TARDE, Nov. 24, 2003, at A4.
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rates are expected to spur growth and employment.5 2
As a coda to this brief historical overview, current develop-
ments are also helpful in determining whether a jurisdiction is
business-friendly to foreign investors. To be sure, there has been
marked improvement in recent years in some important segments
of the political economy. Since 1994, the country's federal anti-
trust agencies have received additional funding for investigation
and adjudication pursuant to an expansion of powers that was
designed to increase the enforcement of competition in the mar-
kets.53 Brazil did not have a law that afforded sufficient protection
to many industrial patents, even though its Industrial Property
Code recognized basic regulations and safeguards under the Paris
Convention. 4 In 1996, Congress approved a patent law55 that
brought the country's legislation up to par with worldwide stan-
dards. Despite this tardy but commendable development in intel-
lectual property, a measure of institutional reform remains to be
done to turn Brazil into a business-friendly environment of the
sort one frequently finds in developed economies. Much else has
been promised, but not yet delivered, to reduce burdensome com-
pliance costs, to correct distortions in both the country's tax codes
and its outdated labor laws, to improve its political and judicial
structures, and to increase efficiency in government services.
Judicial reform is considered crucial because an ineffective legal
system can become a significant obstacle to attracting foreign
direct investment.5 , However, some steps have been taken in the
direction of reducing "red tape," and reforming the antiquated
bankruptcy law to allow failed corporations to reorganize.57
In a scenario of relative worldwide economic freedom, capital
investment will naturally flow to a point in which the return of
capital is at its highest and the level of risk is at its lowest. One of
the factors which impacts total capital return is the level of taxa-
tion imposed on worldwide earnings and profits. As a developing
country, Brazil should impose a reasonable tax burden on foreign
investors' profits, but the question remains on how tax policy
52. See Marcelo Aguilar, BC Contra a Recessdo, EPOCA, Nov. 24, 2003, at 48.
53. See Lei No. 8.884194.
54. C6DmIO DE PROPRIEDADE INDUSTRAL, available at http://www.soleis.adv.br/
codigopropriedadeindustrial.htm.
55. See Lei No. 9.279.
56. See Anthony Pecotich, et al., Towards a Framework for Legal and Judicial
Capacity Building in Developing Economies, WORLD BANK NEWS PRESS RELEASE,
2002, at 1, 7. See also A Alma t Mais Importante Que o Visual, JORNAL DA TARDE,
Dec. 1, 2003, at A3.
57. See Mignone, supra note 26.
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should react in response to geographic investment shifting by
multinationals in response to tax rate differentials between juris-
dictions. No one questions that tax collections may fairly reduce
the total return of capital, given that the private sector should
transfer resources that are necessary for the proper functioning of
the public sector and that would be taxed in the investor's home
jurisdiction in any case. Nevertheless, while tax receipts have
been important to meet short-term fiscal goals, the government
stands to benefit from considering lowering statutory tax rates to
ensure competitiveness in attracting and retaining foreign
investment.
In addition, attention should be paid to tax-related aspects
that indirectly reduce profitability, such as the impact on double
income tax treaties of key concepts in domestic law. One of the
concepts that engender conflicts of interpretation and practice is
the constitutional distinction between taxes and contributions, a
concept that can best be described as romantic. Within the federal
tax system, taxes are charged on income and capital gains, for the
purpose of funding general public expenses and a percentage of
the total tax revenue is shared with state and local governments."
Contributions, on the other hand, are constitutionally mandated
charges targeted over a number of financial and business transac-
tions for the purpose of providing funding for areas such social
security, 9 welfare,"0 public education,6" professional and labor
organizations,6 2 and government regulatory activities.' Notably,
contributions are not shared with the state and local govern-
ments. Furthermore, the federal government has residual powers
to create new taxes, although this authority does not come with-
out constitutional restrictions.
4
Occasionally, the federal government creates a new tax in the
guise of a contribution in order to circumvent constitutional
restrictions, avoid sharing its revenue with state and local govern-
ments, and more importantly for foreign investors, to avoid the
application of treaty language that limits the withholding income
58. See BRz. CONST. art. 159.
59. See id. at art. 195.
60. See id. at art. 235.
61. See id. at art. 212, §5 °.
62. See id. at arts. 149 & 240.
63. See id. at art. 149.
64. A new levy may not be made to assess a taxable event or come with the same
tax basis as an existing tax. See id. at art. 154(1).
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tax rate imposed by a contracting party." In some cases, even if
the new "contribution" has the equivalent effect of a withholding
income tax, it is not considered a creditable foreign tax in the
investor's home jurisdiction. Thus, this tax cost may only be
deducted from the foreign investor's worldwide income, and may
not be used as a foreign tax credit against its total tax liability.
This raises the cost of cross-border transactions and affects long-
term financial planning, particularly in inter-company transac-
tions. Frequently, the only course of action available for an inves-
tor is to litigate the matter in tax court, a resolution which causes
friction and delays, reduces predictability, and raises the cost of
doing business.
In order to further boost investor confidence, the government
should restart bilateral talks with other governments to facilitate
the negotiation and signing of mutual investment treaties. Such
treaties, which require presentment to the legislative branch,
have a common nucleus of clauses that are efficient mechanisms
to drive international trade and investment. These treaties confer
a most-favored nation status to the signatories (with the exception
of grand-fathered rights accorded to third countries under inter-
national free trade agreements), and grant investor protections
over and above what is generally available under domestic law.
These protections include: the selection of a neutral forum for the
resolution of disputes arising under the treaty in the shape of
immediate recourse to arbitration under the rules of the Interna-
tional Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes;66 likewise,
parties would resort to neutral and binding arbitration for mat-
ters of interpretation of the treaty; complete freedom from capital
controls that may limit, defer or block the remittance of profits
and interest payments to foreign beneficiaries; and fast-track
measures for the recovery of capital invested in assets that
become subject to a government taking or expropriation. Given
the possibility that the treaties' language may be held to be uncon-
stitutional on some grounds and to infringe on national sover-
65. The majority of Brazil's double taxation treaties limit the withholding income
tax on royalty and interest payments to a rate of 15%. See e.g., Sec. 12(2)(b) of the
Double Taxation Treaty Signed Between the Netherlands and Brazil, Legislative
Decree 60/90 and Decree 355/93 and Sec. 12(2)(b) of the Double Taxation Treaty
Signed Between Sweden and Brazil, Legislative Decree 93/75 and Decree 77053/76.
66. The Center was established by the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, on Oct. 14, 1966.
See Settlement of Investment Disputes, October 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159.
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eignty,6 7 Congress has interrupted the legislative procedure for
ratification of these treaties with important trading partners such
as France, 8 effectively postponing the discussion on this matter
indefinitely. Therefore, it is advisable that the Brazilian govern-
ment's position on this important matter should be reviewed and
action should be taken to reinstate both legislative scrutiny and
treaty approval procedures. 9
The jurisdiction of regulatory agencies, conceived as a bul-
wark against political interference in regulated industries such as
energy, telecommunications and health care, has been questioned
and remains contentious. Large-scale privatization in the 1990's
67. The Congressional Record's legislative history reflects that, for reasons of
perceived ambiguities in the language of the treaties and concerns over national
sovereignty, the treaty ratification process in Congress was tabled (retirado de pauta)
for further consultation. See DiAuo DA CAMARA DOS DEPUTADOS 10,034 (March 30,
2001). Treaties that have been signed with the governments of France (PDC-395/
2000), Germany (PDC-396/2000), Switzerland (PDC-348/1996), Portugal (PDC-365/
1996), Chile (PDC-366/1996) and the United Kingdom (PDC-367/1996) await
ratification. Sovereignty, or the power of a State to determine the reach of its laws, is
a recurring theme in Brazil's relationship with creditor and trader nations, and its
impact on international relations generally hinges on whether a given governmental
act pertains to the state's relative position to other states where political concerns
predominate (jure imperii) or where the act concerns economic or commercial
interests (jure gestionis); if sued, a state may waive sovereign immunity only in the
latter case. The U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
in 1976 and in effect codified the practice of the waiver of state immunity either
explicitly or by implication. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11, 1605(a)(1) (1976). Brazil has
no similar statute. Historically, Latin American states have resisted attempts by
aggrieved foreign private parties to apply foreign law or seek recourse to their home
governments, even after local remedies were exhausted. The most famous historical
example of this approach was the Calvo Doctrine and its contractual corollary, which
when included in international agreements, stipulated that the alien party agreed
that disputes arising out of the terms of the agreement were to be settled by the
national courts of the contracting state in accordance with the latter's national law.
68. See Decreto 395/2000, retirado de pauta de oficio em 29.04.2003. Recent
remarks from the French Secretary of the Economy have focused on Brazil's need for
clear and stable rules in order to attract further long-term inbound investment from
France, overall the country's 4th largest source of foreign investment. "Ministro
Francs Pede Regras Claras", 0 Estado de Sdo Paulo, July 25, 2003.
69. Art. 49(I) of the Federal Constitution gives Congress the exclusive jurisdiction
over the approval of government action which affects public property. See BwAz.
CONST. art. 49(I). The mutual investment treaties provide for payment of just
compensation in case of expropriation must be made without undue delay. See id.
Art. 184 of the Federal Constitution provides that the government may exercise its
power of eminent domain to take "unproductive" rural property in cases of public
"social interest" and art. 182 provides for similar powers in case of "sub-utilized or
unutilized" urban property. Id. at art. 184, 182. Compensation for takings under
Arts. 182 and 184 is tendered through public debt instruments that are redeemable
over 10 or 20 years respectively, and trade at a discount in the secondary markets.
See id. Thus, adjustments or reservations to the treaties will likely focus on whether
Arts. 182 and 184 conflict with the treaty language that requires prompt payment.
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has caused the diminution of the influence of the state in the econ-
omy, and since 1998, nine independent agencies have been cre-
ated. As a result, regulatory activity has greatly increased in
Brazil, as has openness in governmental action. Although this
development has been a welcomed departure from the political
tradition of decision-making behind closed doors and the absence
of clear rules, it has plainly evidenced the limited utility of some
cabinet-level bureaucracies. There is no need for perspicacity of
the political observer to conclude that sharing power with regula-
tory agency officers with independent mandates would cause reac-
tions from those who believe that more government is the solution
to society's ills.
Notably, the Secretary of Communications engaged in a per-
sonal campaign to rewrite public utility contractual clauses,
signed between telecommunications operators and ANATEL, the
local equivalent of America's Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC).7" These clauses provide for periodical adjustments of
land-based telephone service charges according to an inflation
index.71 While the issue is currently being litigated in court, and
the Secretary has refrained from further posturing on the matter,
a court injunction has been awarded that replaces the contractual
index with another inflation index.72 This new inflation index pro-
vides for a lower adjustment, consequently raising a narrow con-
cern among investors with respect to the government's
commitment to the principle of pacta sund servanda, which
requires compliance with contractual obligations, and a wider and
more serious concern in connection with a perception that the cur-
rent administration wishes to roll back the autonomy of the regu-
latory agencies. 3
70. See Augusto G6es & Jodo Carlos Pinheiro, Novo presidente da Anatel garante:
"ndo haverd rupturas", TELEBRASIL ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2003, at http://www.telebrasil.org.
br/artigos/outros-artigos.asp?m=136; see also Anatel autoriza aumentos apesar das
reaqdes contrdrias do planalto, TRiBUNA DO NORTE ONLINE, at http://www.
tribunadonorte.com.br/anteriores/030705/econonecol.html.
71. See G6es & Pinheiro, supra note 71, at http://www.telebrasil.org.br/artigos/
outrosartigos.asp?m= 136.
72. Miro: se Justiqa der indice maior para telefonia, ndo poderd haver cobranva
retroativa, 0 GLOBO, MAR. 3, 2003, at http'//www.mj.gov.br/DPDC/clipping/2003/
julho/170703.htm#Miro.
73. Omniously, the chairman of ANATEL stepped down in January of 2004, and
was replaced by a political appointee. See 0 Alvo Do Golpe Na Anatel, 0 ESTADO DE
S.PAULO, January 8, 2004, at A3; Editorial, A Nefasta Saida De Schymura, JORNAL DA
TARDE, January 9, 2004, at A3. Recent changes made to the rules governing the
electric power sector have weakened the regulatory agency ANEEL and strengthened
the Ministry of Mines and Energy. See Celso Ming, 0 Novo Modelo Energotico,
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The decision to make a foreign direct investment in Brazil is
not as simple as it may seem from the outset. As far as its public
accounts, the country is on firmer ground; the 1987 unilateral for-
eign debt payment moratorium is becoming a somewhat remote
memory. 4 The same may be said of the hyperinflation that per-
meated business activity and caused the ubiquitous use of cost-of-
living adjustments prior to the monetary reform initiative
launched in 1993, and known thereafter as the Plano Real." No
longer will the local currency undergo a relentless decline in
purchasing power, even though the annual inflation rate will
likely remain higher than in developed economies, and daily news-
papers continue to publish an array of indices that measure the
inflationary impact on all walks of life.
Regarding the exchange rate, the government has in the past
insisted on adjusting for chronic inflation with an incremental
devaluation policy that was imperfect at best. Subsequently, the
government experimented in the heady post-Real days with a
quasi-fixed foreign exchange rate, similar but not quite as rigid as
neighboring Argentina's ley de convertibilidad, with predictably
weak results." It has since adopted an approach where currency
is freely traded through brokerages, which responds to market
demand. Nevertheless, a differential exchange rate system
remains in place, prior regulatory approval is required in certain
cases, a compliance process must be followed for authorized remit-
JoRNAL DA TARDE, Dec. 12, 2003, at A2; Ura Ameaga, Ndo Ura Soluqdo, JORNAL DA
TARDE, Dec. 15, 2003, at A3.
74. A foreign debt crisis that escalated during the 1980's, fueled by a fiscal crunch
and inflationary pressures, became an impediment to Brazil's economic growth. In the
first half of the decade, banking and lending institutions sought to reschedule the
country's foreign debt while reducing their loan commitments to Brazil. These loans
had in the past brought sizable profits to commercial lenders, at the expense of great
risk exposure. ScoTT MAcDONALD, THE GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS 22 (Pinter Publishers,
1990). The economic performance of the latter half of the decade came to bear that it
had been wise for the banking sector to reduce their Brazilian investment portfolios,
albeit a decision that was implemented too late to avoid the full brunt of the crisis. In
1987 Brazil declared a moratorium on its debt payment obligations which lasted
eighteen months. The country ended 1988 with inflation at an annualized rate of
2,000%. In 1989, annual domestic growth remained low at 1% and inflation ran at
40% a month. By the end of the decade the numbers demonstrated that banks were no
longer making profits in Brazil. Id. at 29. In early 2004, the Brady Bond (C-Bond), a
collateralized instrument that is Brazil's most liquid foreign debt paper, was
transacted for the first time at full face value in secondary markets, partly due to a
greater appetite for risk on the part of foreign investors. See Paulo Pinheiro, Alta Do
C-Bond Puxa Bovespa Para Cima, JORNAL DA TARDE, Jan. 9, 2004, at A10.
75. Law 8.880/94, available at http://www.societario.com.br/leisfL8880.html.
76. Jeffrey Sachs, Self-inflicted Wounds, FINANc AL TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999, at http://
www.geocities.com/Eureka/Concourse/8751/edisiO3/brzlO3.htm.
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tances, and monetary barriers are occasionally imposed on out-
bound obligations as a tool to reduce the balance of payments
pressures. One such restriction affected short-term financing for
imported goods, also known as supplier's credit, and required Bra-
zilian importers to anticipate the purchase of foreign currency
before the due date of installment payments owed to the
exporter,77 causing cash flow problems and encouraging financing
on longer terms. This restriction was repealed in 1999;78 however,
the Brazilian Central Bank has since been known to impose fines
on the importing transactions that failed to comply with the
restriction while it lasted.79
The current administration is squaring in on remaining
trouble spots, such as improving the public pension system's
structural and chronic deficit. One hopes it comes around to
assisting the state governments in putting a stop to serial squat-
ting in rural areas by landless peasants bearing a slight civil
rights gloss and, to a lesser extent, to the urban homeless bent on
occupying tenements in the inner cities. Many of these homeless
people remain in inner city tenements for weeks under protective
court orders. The expansion of mechanized agriculture in the
country's mid-western frontier and in the farmlands of southern
Brazil has uprooted thousands of day laborers and sharecroppers,
and many have a legitimate claim to a roof over their heads or to a
piece of land to till. The orchestration and media-grabbing atten-
tion these actions cause tend to skirt the legal and orderly mecha-
nisms that are available for ultra low-cost financing to purchase
an apartment, or to undertake land redistribution without the
taking of private property by force or threats.
In conclusion, the potential upside from targeting a huge mar-
ket for goods and services seems to present a sufficient condition
to justify long-term investment in the face of the greater risk of
exposure of invested capital than encountered in the developed
world. This market has indeed proved highly profitable for many
domestic and foreign investors over the past decades. But this is
not a market that can be approached using the same techniques
77. See Central Bank (BACEN) Circular 2.747 (1997), available at http://www.bcb.
gov.br.
78. Central Bank (BACEN) Circular 2.948 (1999), available at http://www.bcb.gov.
br.
79. See BRAz. CONST. art. I. See Aplicagdo da Lei 9.817/99 e a ImposiQdo de
Multas Pelo Banco Central do Brasil ds Empresas Importadoras, INFORMATIVO JETRO,
July 11, 2002, available at http://www.jetro.org.br/pt/informativosIJ-AIN01-020711.
pdf.
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used in other countries. One must be as tenacious as the
bandeirantes, erstwhile pioneers who were obstinate in course and
purpose, as long as the reward was within reach. Likewise, if
allowances are made to approach this market by making the
adjustments that are necessary to handle the cultural restrictions
to business, the challenge can be met and one can well emerge
with a profitable and rewarding investment for years to come.
